Trying to make sense of the growing financial crisis in Europe is like attempting to explain the Tim Tebow phenomenon in the United States. It’s simple yet complicated. Europe is entering a period of prolonged uncertainty and potential calamity. However, there has been one country that has provided a small glimmer of hope: Great Britain. Countries like Greece look as if their days are numbered as they grapple with the realization that defaulting on their debt is imminent. The latest bond sales for Italy and Spain have hardly been reassuring in terms of their long-term viability in trying to finance their debt. France is the latest country to join the ever-expanding queue of troubled nations as S&P downgraded their precious Triple-A rating just this month.
Overseeing this potential disaster is Germany and the European Central Bank. Over the last few months both Germany and the ECB have been urged to come up with a silver bullet solution that will stave off the growing crisis. Unfortunately for Germany and the ECB, that “solution” would most likely entail financing at least in part a major European bailout of debt-ridden countries like Greece, in addition to the ECB having to guarantee bondholders’ investments.
Unlike many countries caught up in this insanity, Britain has been able to keep a safe distance from the troubled mainland. The main reason is because they have tackled their deficit and debt problems head on. In the summer of 2010 a new Liberal Democrat/Conservative coalition took office after 13 years of Labour Party rule, which left them with the largest peacetime deficit in the country’s history. Upon entering office, Prime Minister David Cameron took action to pull Great Britain back from potential economic and financial ruin. Part of this was an Emergency Spending Review in which the Treasury Department, led by Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne, instituted massive cuts to government expenditure. These included spending cuts in areas such as welfare, law enforcement and public sector workers’ pensions.
Unfortunately, political gridlock in the legislative branch and ineptitude in the executive branch have put a halt to any real progress in the United States as far as addressing our soaring deficits and debt. Real plans of any radical and fiscal reform offered by politicians like Paul Ryan seemed destined to die in the Democrat-controlled Senate, much less being signed into law by President Obama.
There is a sad irony in the United States that its politicians have to face up to. Right now politicians blame partisan gridlock from Democrats and Republicans for the lack of progress on issues like the deficit and the debt. Great Britain, on the other hand, is governed by a coalition government of two distinctly different political parties, the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, whose ideological differences rival that of Democrats and Republicans. However, despite the range of differences on most issues, the two parties came together in the national interest of their country in an attempt to restore the country’s finances. By tackling its deficit and debt immediately, Great Britain has maintained its Triple-A ratings, historic low interest rate, and the real prospect of eliminating its structural budget deficit in the next four years.
The changes being implemented in Great Britain have by no means gone smoothly. Riots last summer and public sector strikes this past fall have illustrated discontent within the public over the government’s course of action. However, in the face of unpopularity, David Cameron has stuck to his guns and challenged his opponents at home and leaders abroad to get serious about the dangers that high debt and deficits invite.
Many have talked about the recent decline in the “Special Relationship” between the United States and Great Britain. While perhaps it is not as strategically important as it once was, it still remains a highly important one symbolically. At the moment Great Britain appears to be waging this war on fiscal responsibility alone as relations with the EU have turned frosty. European leaders met again on January 30th for yet another summit in trying to solve this crisis. The only positive to take away from that meeting was that Nicholas Sarkozy and David Cameron avoided the second coming of Waterloo.

A more telling sign of the general disapproval towards Gingrich actually comes from his former place of business, the House of Representatives. According to The Hill newspaper, only 10 members of Congress have so far endorsed Newt. A whopping 2 of those served with him while he was Speaker, hardly a ringing endorsement of his leadership.

On the other hand, his primary rival, Mitt Romney, has garnered 73 endorsements from current Congressmen and Senators. Twenty-one of those 73 served with Gingrich in the House. Those who have endorsed Romney over Gingrich include: Dave Camp (Michigan),Chairmen of the Ways and Means Committee, Hal Rogers (Kentucky), Chairman of Appropriations, Buck McKeon (California), Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Lleana Ross-Lehitinen (Florida), Chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, John Mica (Florida), Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and Mike Rogers (Michigan), Chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Endorsements don’t win elections but they don’t hurt ( I may have to revisit this position in light of the potential adverse effect Herman Cain’s endorsement of Newt might have with women). Elections are popularity contests, and Gingrich is not popular with rank n’ file Republicans. Whether that qualifies them as “establishment” is probably a bridge too far. Pointing fingers at the “establishment” seems to be nothing more than a cheap ploy by Gingrich and his surrogates to boost Gingrich’s populous appeal.

There is no doubt that Newt has taken rather a beating in recent weeks at the hands of the Romney machine. Normally I would sympathize with Newt, but he always appears to be playing the victim. Gingrich’s reluctance to run a traditional campaign has yet to cost him the nomination, but it certainly hasn’t done him any favors. The best Gingrich can do is receive annual capital injections from Las Vegas Casino owner, Sheldon Adelson, in hopes that he can keep pace with Romney financially.

In the latest primary result of Florida, Newt was taken out to the woodshed by the better organized and better financed candidate, Romney. In defeat, Gingrich was defiant, claiming he had 46 states to go before securing the nomination. This was vintage Gingrich.

I then come back to my original question:  Does anybody like Newt? Probably, but they’re certainly not sprinting to his defense.

In light of President Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s recent remarks regarding the new face of the American military, I felt that a look back into the successes and failures of the last decade could shed some truth on an increasingly complicated matter.  Gone are the days of ambitious nation-building and an aggressive commitment to spread the American idea abroad.  Gone is the sense of responsibility all American’s felt after 9/11, that our nation is responsible as the Global Superpower to show developing nations that totalitarianism and oppression are not the answers.  The idealism of the last decade has been washed away in the very real tide of economic hardship.  Yet perhaps a look back into the world just a few years ago can help us prevent ourselves from repeating the mistakes of the past.  Although our amibitious ideals resulted in two ill-conceived interventions and a host of other problems, it did give birth to a great good, a new way of fighting wars: Counterinsurgency Strategy. Below I defend a strategy that is seemingly non existent.

The New Way of War

Iraq today looks much, much different than it did in 2004.  Even as President Bush proudly declared an end to combat operations in Iraq and famously saluted the “Mission Accomplished” banner aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, an insurgency was forming throughout the war-torn country that would soon grow out of control.  As the insurgency grew, the tactical ignorance of the military and civilian leaders in charge of operations in Iraq grew more and more clear.  In A Time of War, Bill Murphy laments the wasted lives of American soldiers who were sent to Iraq “without their tanks” because they “were too imposing”; soldiers who were sent by the thousands to a country they knew nothing about to be shot at by people that they would never see (99).  In the first year of the Iraqi insurgency, officers were told that “it was only a matter of time before one of their soldiers was wounded or killed by an I[mprovised] E[xplosive] D[evice]” without subsequently being informed how to spot or avoid these devices (113).  Soldiers who had trained for their entire careers to fight a conventional war were being sent, knowingly, to their deaths in patrols that served no particular purpose save as target practice for Iraqi insurgents.  For three more years violence grew un-contained.  Causalities skyrocketed, and it appeared to many that there could be no victory in Iraq.  Yet as the casualties mounted, change slowly took shape.  Officers who before 2007 saw the war as a death-trap for men who were not trained to fight insurgents “[came] to believe that the war in Iraq was winnable”, for “the Army had finally seen the light: Get the Iraqi army and police…to start taking the lead” (308).  Teaching “[the Iraqis] to secure their own country” would be no easy task, but the emphasis on restoring legitimacy to the Iraqi government would change the course of the war forever.  Four thousand, four hundred and eighty-four American deaths later, the streets of Baghdad are mostly quiet.  The walls that American forces built to separate Iraqi religious sects have become permanent fixtures in an increasingly divided nation, but there is peace.  Even as “green Shiite flags line” Iraqi streets and Iran “has a close ally and trading partner in Iraq”, violence for the most part is no longer an option to the everyday Iraqi (Engel 1).  The war has not been pretty, and American interests in the Middle East have been severely compromised, but they have not been devastated.  But how can the United States transplant the successful neutralization of the Iraqi insurgency into Afghanistan?  What have civilian and military leaders learned from the ill-fated expedition into Iraq?

To America’s Global War on Terror, Afghanistan means everything and nothing all at once.  Victory has eluded the United States and her NATO allies for over a decade, and there are contradictory signs as to if victory is any closer now than it was when this war began.  The stakes are too high to retreat, the risks too great to be ignored.  What happens there could change things everywhere.  America’s symbolic invincibility will without doubt not survive a retreat from Afghanistan, though in truth there are very few who still believe in the idea of limitless power anyway.  No, the real consequences could be materially as well as financially devastating.  As James Carafano writes in “Obama Must Win”:

Afghanistan could look a lot more like Vietnam in 1973… Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over…Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear war…Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff… the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914.

Regardless of whether or not American forces should have invaded Afghanistan or not, they are there.  What policymakers and intellectuals alike should look to then is how to prevent Carafano’s nightmare scenario from coming to fruition.  How can we win a war that seems unwinnable and prevent the growth of international terrorism?  By studying the successes and failures of American interventions abroad, as well as understanding the strategies that the United States used in the context of modern international law, it becomes clear that a Counterinsurgency strategy is the only military model capable of neutralizing a threat that conventional warfare largely fails at dealing with.  In assessing the validity of any military strategy in Afghanistan, it is important to look at its past successes, failures, and potential alternatives as well as its current level of success in the Central Asian region.  The world may not be safer because the United States invaded Afghanistan, but if COIN has anything to say about it, it will be after the U.S has finished the job.

Counterinsurgency is as multifaceted as it is revolutionary, and coming to grips with the new role that it prescribes for American military forces is essential to understanding when it is an appropriate strategy to use.  In the U.S Army Field Manual 3-24, known more widely as the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, General David Petraeus established in conjunction with a whole array of military and civilian contributors a strategy “cognizant of international rights standards, expectations of accountability, and transparency” (xxxiv).  Counterinsurgency wins wars not by killing until the enemy surrenders in the conventional sense, but instead by seizing “the primacy of the political” so as to develop host government “leadership” that will eventually result in a “negotiated solution to…the insurgency” (xxix).  It is not, as it was in Vietnam, a hollow call to win the hearts and minds of the occupied population.  Instead, modern day counterinsurgency puts serious responsibility on civilian elements of the American national government in the form of concrete expectations for state department officials in the process of nation-building.  Continuing to attempt to govern an occupied country would be a “fatal national flaw”, yet “effectively employing nonmilitary power…is not a responsibility that can be left to a beleaguered host nation” (xxxvii).  Striking a critical balance between outsourcing government responsibilities to the newly formed host government and using the power of the America’s own resources to effectively rid the region of insurgents is essential.  Creating a stable host government requires an expansion “along the rights continuum, beyond physical security” towards a more “holistic form of human security”, and “diplomats” as well as “contractors” are essential in achieving this objective (xxx).  Human security allows indigenous populations to move beyond the immediate goal of survival and onwards towards civic and economic activism, which is an essential element in establishing stability anywhere.

In Iraq, this security gave rise to the Sunni awakening councils, village militias who rebelled against their Al-Qaeda leaders because of the American promise of stability coupled with a popular turn against Islamic fundamentalism.  To the Iraqis, when the AQIM (Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia) militants “started imposing sharia law, beheading people on street corners and demanding access to their daughters, [Iraqi] hospitality turned into hostility” and the American promise of “law and order” became too enticing to pass up (Chulov 1).  The Sons of Iraq remained loyal to the United States and “helped turn the tide of the insurgency” even after AQIM was defeated precisely because American leaders were able to effectively utilize COIN’s incentive structure when dealing with Awakening Council leaders (1).  Local support spread like wildfire, and newly forming Awakening Councils provided invaluable assistance “in hunting down their former insurgent allies” and “members of the Islamic militias” whilst doing much to dispel the idea that the war was an exclusively foreign enterprise (1).  To many Iraqis, the war was no longer Muslim versus infidel American; it had become a struggle of ideals.  The foreign invaders slowly came to be identified as the Saudi, Pakistani, Yemeni, and Palestinian al-Qaeda in Iraq militants, not the Americans.  A conventional force promising nothing to the population and remaining segregated from local politics could never have responded to the internal Sunni division the way that American forces did in Iraq.  As FM 3-24 accurately points out, cooperation with former insurgents was not “simply a refinement on the margins of U.S. practice”, it represented a “paradigm shattering” reversal in American military strategy because tactical success was placed before ideological differences (xxxv).  What was even more shocking was that many of the Sons of Iraq were former Ba’ath party loyalists or members of the Army who had lost their job after the U.S. occupying authority initially dissolved the Iraqi army after the invasion in 2003.  It certainly makes one wonder how much sooner the war would have ended if the existing Iraqi Army had been used to calm sectarian tensions and restore faith in the emerging Iraqi government.

Political implications aside, what does Counterinsurgency strategy offer in terms of a change to the approach of actual combat situations?  For one, not all “COIN efforts require large combat formations” to effectively neutralize a larger insurgent force (187).  In fact, in drawing on the Combined Action Program (CAP), which was conceived and successfully implemented on a small scale in Vietnam by the Marine Corps, counterinsurgents are called on instead to focus on “advising security forces and providing fire support and sustainment” (187).  Instead of displays of force and “shock and awe” tactics, American forces should emphasize the ability of host nation forces to protect the indigenous population.  This not only creates conditions where killing is less necessary, it keeps American soldiers out of harm’s way because ideally, host nation forces are fighting the brunt of the insurgency. Regardless, combat in the context of counterinsurgency operations can be classified as the “clear” component of Counterinsurgencies’ now famous clear-hold-build strategy.  FM 3-24 reminds commanders that “offensive operations are only the beginning” of success and that “[removing] entrenched insurgent infrastructure is just as if not more important to the ultimate success of COIN operations than the actual fighting (176).  This represents a stark contrast from the United States’ first few years of involvement in Iraq, which over-emphasized the “clear” element of COIN strategy without creating a mechanism so as to insure that secured areas do not fall back into insurgent hands after American forces depart.  This resulted both in frustrating patterns of clearing areas only to lose them hours later and also initially gave soldiers a false sense of security in areas that were previously secured.  Learning the lessons of 21^st century warfare was hard, but today’s Armed Forces are prepared to wage an international law abiding, humanitarian intervention without replicating the struggles of the United States’ first few years in Iraq.

Regardless of its changes to military strategy or its good intentions, the question still as to if COIN is desirable in Afghanistan has yet to be answered.  In assessing strategic success at any level, it is important to find where the United States stands in the conflict today.  What has counterinsurgency strategy up to this point accomplished, if anything?  In comparing relative levels of violence in Afghanistan today with those of earlier points in the insurgency, progress is very clearly being made.  As Defense Secretary Panetta exclaimed to American troops in mid-December of 2011, “the soldiers’ sacrifices are paying off” and “insurgent violence [has declined] to its lowest level in five years, despite recent high-profile attacks” (Shanker A6). Not only have overall levels of violence decreased, but additionally “U.S.-led NATO forces have weakened the Taliban to the point where the militants have not been able to regain” territory lost in last year’s troop surge, including “critical areas” in the “Taliban’s heartland” (A6).  But even with all of the gains that Coalition forces have made in the last two years, the scaling back of European forces makes it very clear that NATO’s commitment to rebuilding Afghanistan has an expiration date.    The solution to the problem of time is not a departure from COIN, but rather a shift in focus within it.

Afghanistan is distinct from Iraq in that its tribal structure is more engrained than its sectarian divides and also in that its population is far more spread out than that of Iraq.  Where Iraqis congregated in dense cities surrounded by barren desert, Afghanistan’s tribes are unevenly dispersed throughout the country.  Securing the few urban centers in Afghanistan has been no problem, but adapting COIN strategy to Afghanistan’s unique tactical environment is critical to long-term success.  In The Wrong War, former Marine Bing West bemoans the drawbacks of certain elements of COIN strategy whilst emphasizing and applauding the success of others.  In the context of the Afghan conflict, much of what FM 3-24 says about training competent host-government armed forces is not useful, because “Pashtun…khans…[do] not want protection by” the “Tajiks or Uzbeks” who “[fill] the ranks” of the Afghan National Army (244). To officers uneducated in Afghan cultural development, this initial rejection was nonsensical and frustrating.  Instead of a national identity uniting the Pashtun populace against the Taliban, what is “key” is instead “local knowledge” (242).  Tajiks are just as ignorant of Pashto culture as Americans are, and the elaborate system of informants and military support that the United States received from Awakening Councils in Iraq is nowhere to be found in Afghanistan because there has been no turning of the right Afghans against the Taliban.

But there have been successes in Afghanistan, and replicating these requires a distinct focus on CAP-centered integration and police training.  In the Garmsir district of the heavily Pashto Helmand province, Marines stabilized a seemingly unstoppable insurgency by:

1) conducting a huge number of patrols to push out the local Taliban; 2) bringing in a tough top cop to root out the secret [weapons and infrastructure] cadres; and 3) sealing off the main infiltration point [for the local Taliban] (243).

Reflected clearly are the clear and hold elements of typical COIN strategy, but what proved to be remarkable is that the build step was done by the Afghans themselves.  Once “the Americans, combined with the Afghan soldiers…pushed out the Taliban, the elders…offered young men from their [tribes] to serve as police” (244).  The local knowledge that American forces so desperately needed came not from extensive focus on nation-building operations, but instead through adapting elements of COIN doctrine to situations that are most important for them.  The Pashtun tribes respected the strength and fighting prowess of the Afghan National Army (ANA) forces to a level where they were comfortable supporting host-government police operations.  What remains of American strength in Afghanistan must “[live] among the people” and “[hear] the local rumors”. They must simultaneously show these “professional chameleons” (i.e the Pashtun tribesmen) that ANA forces can prevail over the Taliban by patrolling “with [them]” (243).  Coalition risk aversion continues to prevent this strategy from being utilized throughout Afghanistan, even as the idea of side-stepping risk runs explicitly and totally contrary to COIN doctrine.

Host government legitimacy is another thorn in the side of Coalition forces throughout Afghanistan.  ANA forces are extremely loyal but poorly-equipped and ill-trained, and in contrast Afghan police forces are adequately armed and trained but often use their power not to “hunt down the Taliban” but rather to “extort the farmers” (242).  As evidenced in Garmsir, the population centric Combined Action Program gives the best of both worlds, but this approach is still widely viewed as unsustainable given current resources for operations in Afghanistan.  American leaders are then left with crossing their fingers and hoping for the best in terms of competent leadership, which has proven time and time again to be an elusive quality for Afghan officials.  This dilemma, however, is not a result of COIN strategy but rather a byproduct of inadequate commitment to it.  There can be no victory if American leaders do not commit themselves fully to the long war ahead.  Our mortal enemy “al-Qaeda is confined to Pakistan only due to our forces in Afghanistan” and a premature withdraw “will result in a civil war likely to be won by the Taliban” (252).   Setting up a permanent force deterrent in Afghanistan, which will also allow for adequate force training by CAP units, would do much to keep al-Qaeda confined to the Pakistani border and could potentially prevent the outbreak of such a civil conflict.

A long-term, smaller force commitment would also do much to solve the Karzai legitimacy question because even if the central government itself is not legitimate, Pashto elders will still respect the Karzai government if its army is seen as able to fend for itself.  Even if “Karzai…has no intention of building a democracy”, Afghan forces can still “[perform] credibly on [their] own” against a possible Taliban civil war if American forces focus on training instead of nation-building (252).  What makes COIN such an effective strategy is its lack of doctrinal rigidity, its flexibility and applicability in multiple wartime situations.  Nation-building and law and order development appealed to the Iraqi Awakening Councils potentially as a result of their dense population and already-established idea of national identity.  To the Pashtun tribes, what turns the elders against the Taliban is not a model democracy or even a very effective government, it is a government that can defend itself and prevail on its own against the Taliban.  Going into “combat with Afghan forces, [providing] the link to fire support” when the ANA is outgunned, and “[having] a voice in who gets promoted” should be the centerpiece of America’s more limited involvement in Afghanistan (253).  Counterterrorism kill teams, drone attacks, and displays of intimidating force may effectively eliminate Taliban leadership, but they run the risk of collateral damage and they do nothing to project the ANA’s effectiveness independent of American forces, which is essential to achieving victory.

There is no use in denying the truth; conventional Counterinsurgency strategy has not succeeded in the way that American forces need it to in Afghanistan.  Although it has reduced overall levels of violence and cleared the Taliban from previously unbreakable strongholds in the south and along the Pakistani border, it has not given rise to the Awakening Councils that were so essential to turning popular support against the insurgency in Iraq.  There is no home-grown counterinsurgency save for the ANA, and even the ANA is considered a foreign Tajik and Uzbek force in the heavily Pashtun south.  Afghanistan’s Awakening will come only after the central government can fend for itself, until it has earned the respect of a tribal structure that is centuries old.  There has been no public rejection of Afghanistan as there was of Iraq or Vietnam.  Support “for the war can be sustained” until our advisers “hand off” the full responsibility of population protection to a legitimate and self-sustaining ANA, but such a process “will” certainly “take years” (253).  This war can be won with neither conventional strength nor the promise of nation-building.  The Afghan population is as unique as it is traditional, and victory is only achievable if Americans “commit to stay in Afghanistan” with a limited advisory force for “as long as it takes” (254).  This is the war we chose to fight when we invaded Afghanistan.  Victory is impossible any other way, and the cost of retreat is too great.  COIN has taught us a new way to fight, and fight we must, but we are no longer alone and without hope.

Works Cited

Chulov, Martin. “Sons of Iraq Turned the Tide for the US. Now They Pay the Price.” The Guardian. 13 May 2010. Web. 15 Dec. 2011.

Engel, Richard. “Post-U.S Iraq: Welcome to Shia-Stan.” Times of Europe. 14 Dec. 2011. Web. 14 Dec. 2011.

Murphy Jr., Bill.  In a Time of War: The Proud and Perilous Journey of West Point’s Class of 2002.  New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2008.  Print.

Shanker, Thom. “Panetta Says U.S., Allies Are Winning Afghan War.” San Francisco Chronicle 15 Dec. 2011: A6. Print.

United States of America. Department of Defense. United States Dept. of the Army. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual : U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24 : Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5. London: University of Chicago, 2006. Print.

West, Francis J.  The Wrong War.  New York: Random House, 2011.  Print.

It’s always fun and entertaining for some to speculate about what a New Year will bring. That’s why New Year’s resolutions are so popular. I stopped making them years ago; it’s better to be pragmatic and realistic than to naively offer wholesale hope and change. Wait a minute! There was this guy from Chicago….

In order for 2012 to be a “good” year, some things will have to be addressed by the powers that be here in the United States. In an attempt to be concise, I have come up with three issues that need to be addressed (and I apologize in advance if my priorities offend readers):

1.) The Economy – No surprise here. Creating private sector jobs and restoring the American economy have to be at the forefront of any policymaker’s agenda;

2.) The Debt – The President continues to punt on this issue. He insists that he takes the debt seriously, but all he has to show for it are a failed super-committee and a commission whose recommendations he ultimately ignored. Quite simply, he has failed, and in the words of Chris Christie, “What the hell are we paying you for?” Anyone laughing at the issue of debt just needs to look at Europe to be reminded of just how bad things can (and will) get;

3.) Foreign Policy – While the economy has become the focus of many, foreign policy need not be forgotten. Current instability in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring coupled with recent events in Russia must serve as a reminder of the importance of U.S. leadership in international affairs. Now is not the time to fall asleep.

While there are certainly many other issues on people’s minds, I believe that these three are the most crucial. I’m sure that there are many out there who would like to see movement on whole host of other issues like gay marriage, abortion, gun rights, the environment, etc. My response to those crying out for action is that these issues aren’t going anywhere. Currently, they don’t represent imminent disaster. (Sorry, but the so-called 99% upset at Wall Street don’t make the cut).

Personally, I think creating private sector jobs, addressing a 15 trillion dollar debt, and maintaining a robust foreign policy are challenging enough without waging war on even more fronts. Their day will come. On the other hand, the three issues outlined above have the potential to cause irreparable harm if there is no movement on them. Having said this, I would be less than shocked if, in a year from now when I am drawing up a new list, the same three things appear on it. So much for New Year’s resolutions.

1. Mitt Romney: Mitt Romney is the Candidate most likely to beat Obama because of two words: Independent voters. The majority of Americans have moderate views on both sides and he is the only candidate whose views match those of most independent voters. Of course, some candidates like Newt Gingrich use this as a point of attack, claiming that Romney isn’t a true enough conservative, or the “Massachusetts moderate” but this will help Romney battle for the independent vote with Obama, possibly winning it as well.

2. Ron Paul: Paul would be able to win a great deal of independent support as well because of his Libertarian views and social liberalism, but he appears to be unelectable because of some of his extreme views. If you’re a conservative who thinks Obama’s actions are too extreme, Paul is much more extreme in the opposite direction. In addition to abolishing numerous federal departments, he would end all U.S. over seas military presence. Considering the fact that we play a strong deterring role in many areas of the world like East Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, etc. This could become bad news for our allies and their defense, but Paul sees it as too wasteful and too much power to the government, so he’ll have a a harder time winning over moderates who are frustrated with Obama.

3. Everyone else: Other than the two above, no other candidates will be able to win the independent vote over Obama because they’re focusing too much on issues like social conservatism that continues to distance themselves from social moderates/liberals that have otherwise right wing perspectives. Rick Santorum only talks in depth about social issues and seems timid compared to Obama. Newt Gingrich is on a purist Republican on a witch hunt against Romney, claiming that he isn’t a “true Reagan conservative,” and seems more concerned about ending the use of negative ads than talking about his proposed policies (on a side note, Newt would be the biggest winner if everyone stopped negative campaigning because he has the most political & personal baggage). Rick Perry destroyed his electability during numerous debate gaffes and his never-ending desire to appeal exclusively to social conservatives and evangelical Christians. And then, there’s Jon Huntsman. I actually like Huntsman and he has a very logical approach to restoring America. Like most of the other Republican candidates, he wants tax reform that closes loopholes and benefits the middle class and small businesses, pursue energy independence and free trade, and regulate departments that have too many job-killing restrictions (most notably the EPA). Since he’s spent the last 2 years in China, he was out of the limelight and never received that much attention from his party base. If Romney wins the nomination, I think there is a good chance that he’ll have Huntsman on board as either his vice president or his secretary of state because of his experience as an ambassador.

The extreme right wing ideologies of some candidates compels the left to pass off the GOP as a joke, but they’re not so perfect themselves. Obama’s biggest fault is that he tries to make everyone happy by pushing measures that can be perceived as “too much government” (Obamacare as the case in point) lighting the Republican base on fire, and then watering it down to complete ineffectiveness, annoying the Democratic base. As far as I’m concerned, Obama has practically served George W. Bush’s third term by continuing many of Bush’s policies. Obama has driven himself into a ditch, and I honestly don’t see how the partisan bickering will ever end until he leaves the White House. Sure, John Boehner, Eric Cantor, and Mitch McConnell hate Obama at this point, but Washington isn’t going to get much better unless Obama stops introducing measures that can be interpreted as quasi-socialist.

I was once told that the best way to decide who you should vote for is by asking yourself whether or not you’re better off now than you were 4 years ago. I’ll leave this up to you to decide.

The Manufacturing versus Environmentalism Battle

The vital fight for the life of the democratic party must come from within.  Extremist environmentalists and others in the party, who have come into a leadership role in states like California and New York, have left nothing but economic devastation in their wake.  The Leftist economic model is not wrong, but the model that these fringe idealists have set is.  A Democratic party that sets its priorities in favor of American workers and Jobs over the demands of the environmental lobby is one that will win the votes of a great many of the blue collar defectors of 2010.  The Ivory Tower of overregulation and “carbon taxes” must be brought down.  A newly unemployed autoworker does not see the “X metric tons of carbon” that the tax that cost him his job prevented, all he sees is his family now without vital financial support.  All of what was said above could be said by a John Boehner or even a Jason Chaffetz or Ron Paul, but the agenda items that will set us apart in the eyes of voters and lobbies alike should include our commitment to organized labor as well as to a strong entitlement spending base.  Private sector unions need not be singing their swan song, and the rallying cries of school teachers, fire fighters, and other public employees in the Wisconsin union battles should stand testament to the still very robust showing of support that unions  generate among blue collar workers.  The time for draconian overregulation is over.  New Democrats must strike the balance not between manufacturing and the environment, but between workers’ rights and manufacturing output.

Our Potential Allies on the Right

It does not take a political scientist to know that the George Bush model Republican is flirting with total annihilation.  Every day, Speaker Boehner is thrust greater into circles of right-wing ideological insanity by the purists in his party.  The paleoconservatives, like Ron Paul and Eric Cantor, have seized leadership positions held for decades by neoconservatives.  Susan Collins, Olympia Snowe, and other more moderate Republicans who have not been as bull headed as their newly arrived Tea Party brethren see their existence threatened more and more by challenges from the right.  Once our own house is in order, accommodating those Republicans who made programs like the Prescription Drug Plan a reality is vital to continuing our electoral survival.  Neoconservatives know larger government is an inevitability, and adding their hawkish foreign policy view to the Democrat platform should not be difficult given the relative silence of the anti-war movement within the Party after the election of President Obama in 2008.  Democrats would rather be in power and sell out their anti-war supporters than be out of power and hold true to a pseudo-idealism.  For as long as I personally have been a Democrat, I have likewise supported a liberal interventionist foreign policy, and I think that the early widespread support for the War in Iraq and the ongoing support for the War in Afghanistan is testament to the views of the American people.  To establishment Republicans, the invitation of friendship is looking nicer and nicer.  Senate Minority Leader McConnel’s division with House Tea Party Republicans is testament to the growing divide between the establishment and fringe Republicans, and the decisive victory that Democrats pulled in the Payroll tax cut battle may soon be one of many as the divide grows larger.  We have accommodated a caucus of fiscal conservatives in the Party since its founding, and in their wake reaching out to the remnants of the neoconservative movement may the best thing the Democratic Party ever did strategically.

Winning the “Drive for 25″

One year ago, Representative Steve Israel (D-NY) was discouraged, underfunded, and altogether unsure of how to lead his party out of what was starting to look like permanent minority status.  On a large scale, Republicans controlled a redistricting throughout a great part of the United States, they controlled the political momentum and message, and they controlled the money game.  Today, in spite of the Republicans’ redistricting edge, Democrats have held a lead in the RCP (Realclearpolitics) generic congressional ballot for months and the payroll tax battle is indicative of a new political message taking hold: the harms and reality of massive-scale income inequality.  We can win back the House of Representatives and hold on to control of the Senate precisely if we continue to win the momentum and control the message.  Yet we cannot win back our blue-collar base unless we settle matters at home first.  Our flirtation with environmental elitism should have ended a decade ago.  The Green crowd will vote Democrat no matter what we support, so long as we continue to remain “better than the other guys”, which truthfully is not hard at all.  Our muscle, our voice, and our momentum can all be found in the hearts of those who supported us all along.  Large-scale Unions are not a thing of the past, but the way of the future.  Winning the message of 2012, fighting income inequality and saving our country from a decade of regression requires that we first find our true friends.

Unsurprisingly, capital, specifically big business, has gained too much power and influence in government. Lately, I have become very cynical about American politics precisely because it is turning into an extension of the corporate world. In 2011, about $2.5 billion was spent on over 12,000 lobbyists in Washington ^[1], with special interest groups and companies like the US Chamber of Congress and GE spending $46 million and $21 million respectively ^[2]. Considering that the average member of Congress makes about $173,000 per year, a company spending millions of dollars lobbying is sure to gain some influence.

We have seen many questionable decisions from Congress that were made after intense lobbying. My favorite among these is a bill that reclassifies pizza as a vegetable in schools. The decision says that the tomato paste on pizza counts as a serving of tomato, even though it is only 31% tomato sauce. Con Agra and Del Monte, two of the primary lobbyists behind the bill, look to profit the most from this change.

Money is also a significant problem with political campaigns and funding from Political Action Committees or PACs. A PAC’s main goal is to elect a candidate or have legislation passed, and they are free to spend as much money as possible to achieve their goal. This was not always the case as the McCain-Feingold Act of 2002 specifically prevented corporations, unions, and nonprofits from directly financing a campaign or paying for TV ads. Law limited the amount of money that a corporation could give to a campaign, and PACs could not spend any money on political advertisements within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election. Unfortunately, the Citizens United case of 2010 eliminated a number of spending restrictions on companies and opened the floodgates to corporate financed elections.

The power and effect of PACs is obvious in the 2012 presidential race. There has never been a time in American history when money has held so much power in our political process. As of Jan 1^st, “Restore Our Future,” a super PAC that favors Mitt Romney, spent approximately $2,750,000 preparing for the Iowa caucus compared to the $1,282,000 that the Romney campaign spent ^[3]. The PAC spent more than twice as much as Romney, and ads financed by these PACs are widely attributed for the downfall of Newt Gingrich.

The reason why these campaign ads were so effective was because of the second part of the Citizens United decision, which ended the restriction on PAC spending for advertisements within 30 days of a primary. Money is nothing new to politics, but previously the law limited the effect that money could have on an election. Without some restrictions, American campaigns turn into a battle for the highest bidder.

In the first seven days of 2012, approximately $23 million has been spent on political campaigning. A staggering $21 million of this was spent by PACs and other special interests, excluding party committees ^[4]. This proportion is disturbingly high, especially when compared to the numbers from 2008 and 2006 (before Citizens United) when approximately half of all spending came from groups other than campaigns.

Noam Chomsky, a professor at MIT, made a poignant statement about the 2008 election and President Obama. He said that President Obama received a large portion of his campaign contributions from financial institutions because “they thought [Obama] would serve them better. And it’s turning out that it’s probably true” ^[5]. Financial institutions are now doing “marvelously” according to Chomsky because of policies that Obama passed and regulation that he failed to pass. There is undoubtedly a direct relationship between campaign funding and proposed legislation.

I realize that my concerns are not new, but the amount of money already being injected into the Republican race is unsettling; donors are ensuring favorable laws for themselves and a direct link to America’s future leaders. Some people, however, think that corporations should have a larger role in American life. My response is that democracy is ruled by the people and for the people. A corporation does not eat, sleep, breath, or have a heartbeat like a regular person. Money is gaining too much influence in politics, and we need to combat this intrusion. We cannot let our country be bought out.

Note: All statistics for campaign spending have increased since posting this article.

[1] http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/incdec.php

[2] http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=s

[3] http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/01/nation/la-na-money-election-20120101

[4] http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/

[5] http://fora.tv/2009/10/06/Noam_Chomsky_Philosophies_of_Language_and_Politics#Noam_Chomsky_Says_Big_Business_Dictates_the_Presidency

According to Stein, the Huffington Post recently “uncovered” a video of Paul discussing the newsletters in a 1987 interview, long before Paul claims he knew of the offensive content. Stein pairs the video with vague language in several mid-90s interviews to cast doubt on the idea that Paul was unaware of the newsletters’ racist content.

Maybe Stein should take a second look at his own evidence, as none of it contradicts Paul’s explanation and none of it suggests he was aware of the newsletters’ offensive content at or even soon after the time of the newsletters’ publication.

First, let’s deal with the video. Is it a smoking gun? Hardly. In the thirty-second clip, Paul relates that he had published an “investment letter” after his time in congress, to educate subscribers on hard money and other economic issues. What does this prove? That Paul published a newsletter, that his intent in publishing it was economic education, and that he believed its contents to be economic in nature. It does not prove Paul  was aware of all the newsletter’s content, including the offensive material. In fact, Paul’s emphasis on economic issues seems to suggest the opposite. Moreover, as Stein points out, the most inflammatory statements came in other newsletters published after the “investment letter” Paul discusses in the interview.

Some muckraking.

The most ardent of Paul’s critics on this issue, like Jackie Kucinich writing for USA Today, not only challenge Paul’s timeline, but continue to attribute the offensive statements to Paul himself. This just doesn’t pass the smell test, as the racist sentiments of the newsletter excerpts run directly contrary to everything Paul propounds and has spent the last thirty-years trying to advance. Here’s something you won’t see in the news outlets intent on destroying Paul.

Ron Paul on Race (links to a Youtube video compiling Paul’s comments on issues of race in America during the 2008 presidential campaign, in which, among other things, Paul challenges the way blacks and other minorities are treated by the criminal justice system and cites Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, Jr., as personal heroes.)

Such exaggeration, imprecision, and–when it comes down to it–shoddy journalism define a large segment of the smear-pieces out on Paul.

My intent here is to point out the problems with the way the newsletters have been treated in the media, not to vouch for Paul personally. I should point out, however, that Neslon Linder, president of the Austin NAACP, had no problem personally vouching for Paul in a 2008 interview, claiming he had known Paul for some time, studied his platform, and come to the conclusion that Paul is no racist.

Here are the remaining contestants in the Republican Soap Opera:

Michelle Bachman has seen her candidacy go from a meteoric rise to a crash landing. She had originally captivated the Republican base with her supposed one-woman crusade against Obama-Care. It still passed and she is seeking recognition for apparently standing in front of a charging train and claiming she stopped it. No-one wonder veteran Republican operator Ed Rollins ditched her campaign.

Rick Santorum. What is there to say? Not much. Despite visiting every county in Iowa, the man is still playing second fiddle to candidates like Bachmann. One would think his impassioned speeches on family values and foreign policy would have elevated and cemented his status to Republican voters as a viable candidate. Instead it only seems to have cemented his status as someone no one would vote for.

Jon Huntsman, the former governor of Utah and ambassador to China has spent the majority of his campaign in New Hampshire staking his candidacy on the granite state. Who is he kidding? There is only room for one Mormon in this race and he doesn’t speak Chinese.

Ron Paul seems to have relished playing the role of the old, wise and often cranky candidate. He seems genuinely shocked and outraged that the United States has a federal reserve, killed terrorists, and criminalized drugs. He is supposedly gaining traction in Iowa. I’m not surprised. Even Howard Dean was once a front-runner in Iowa.

Rick Perry. See Dartmouth College Debate.

Newt Gingrich. Who saw that coming? The man has more enemies than Richard Nixon. He is the latest candidate to be the “chosen one” of the anyone but Mitt faction. His problems: his speakership was marred with controversies that included numerous ethics complaints, an affair with a staffer while simultaneously bringing charges against Bill Clinton for alleged oval office shenanigans, and a coup against him by his own leadership. Out of office he lobbied on behalf of great companies like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, appeared in a global warming television ad with Nancy Pelosi, ran up a $250,000 Tiffany’s bill, and unflattering photos while on a Greek cruise. Other than that he has nothing to worry about.
Finally there is Mitt Romney. I sometimes wonder who puts more gel in his hair. Romney or the male cast from Jersey Shore. He faces the precarious position of being distrusted by the far right but also the only candidate independents will vote for out of the Republican field. Some say he will say anything to be elected. Please. Have you ever met a politician who won’t? I remember a certain Senator from Illinois promising to close Guantanamo Bay, end the Bush tax cuts, and include a public option in his health-care plan. Romney represents the only acceptable candidate in the Republican primary. Unhappy conservatives need to realize that there is Republican version of the 2008-candidate Obama on offer for this coming Presidential Election. The sooner they realize that the sooner they will come to the realization that there is no credible alternative to Mitt.

As the United States enters a volatile period of rethinking and reshaping the role of government, the global imprint of the United States may shrink substantially due to necessary fiscal cutbacks. This type of thinking can, and most likely will, be detrimental for the future position of the United States in international affairs.  Over the past ten years, while the US has faced war and soaring debt, nations like China, India, and Russia focused more on their long term, economic planning. The economies of China and India have expanded faster than the economies of any other countries in the developing world, which shows their relative success. Russia, with its diplomatic ties to anti-western states such as Iran and an abundance of natural gas, stands to play a major role in global politics of the future. Key to these countries’ success was favorable labor markets for foreign direct investment from multi-national companies. As corporations refocused their efforts abroad, these nations reaped the benefits from cheap labor. These national economies grew at high rates, and the governments had the insight to reinvest the profits at home.

Important results of these reinvestments include a massive rearmament and an increased focus on alliances abroad.

As growing economies, such as in Latin America, look to diversify their markets, it will be difficult for the Western World, America, and Europe to compete with the accelerating economies of China and India. Over the past ten years China has formed economic ties with Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and even Mexico. If China can extend its grasp to a NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) country, then the US will need to rethink its reversion to isolationist tendencies.

India and China have used money from foreign investment to improve their navies and air forces. The PLAN (Peoples Liberation Army Navy) has used its soon to be commissioned aircraft carrier to symbolize China’s naval buildup. China and India have also allocated large amounts of money to research and create 21^st century stealth aircraft. From the perspective of a realist, not only do these developments pose threats to American military hegemony, but they stand to create a new power struggle in the Pacific. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has, on more than one occasion, sat before Congress and cautioned about the detrimental effects of decreased military spending on the American footprint around the world. I am inclined to look back to the philosophies of Dick Cheney and Condy Rice and think that in order for the our nation to protect itself, we must continue to be the largest power on the world stage and protect our interests abroad. Countries like China and India will no doubt be front and center in the future, but where will the United States of America stand? It is time for the Jacksonians in Washington to do whatever it takes to prevent our global footprint from shrinking. If the US continues with these austere plans, we could very likely see a refocused global power struggle taking place in the Pacific.